

The True Life of Human in the Thought of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī

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ABSTRACT

Knowledge of the reality of the human being and consideration of the ultimate end of human life have been the focus of attention of scholars of reason and revelation. This important matter manifests when they know where the scope of reproduction and the outcome of human life and everyday striving leads. In this regard, there is a conflict of opinions; some, with a natural-material anthropological view, regard true life as the provision of worldly and sensory pleasures and the desires of animal faculties; some consider it felicity, and some consider it rational life. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has considered true life to be the combination of matter and meaning, and he regards its final instance as the pure life in the vicinity of divine mercy in the hereafter, and he considers the difference between true life and pure life to be in inclusiveness and expansion; he has also referred to true life as spiritual and higher life, and considers it to be of the category of existential perfection and based on the soul dimension of the human being. This paper, in a descriptive-analytical method, has reached the conclusion that life is derivative and posterior to the soul, and that true life is the ultimate end of the possible end of the human being, crystallized eternally in the abode of the hereafter, and its actualization requires certain elements such as: intellect, correct knowledge (theoretical knowledge), righteous action, faith, and free will, which are influential in the formation and mechanism of true life, and its domain includes all human beings, provided that they have reached the necessary threshold.

1. INTRODUCTION

Anthropological inquiry constitutes one of the most ancient and enduring domains within the intellectual history of humankind, occupying the reflective concern of numerous thinkers across epochs. Investigation into the nature and reality of the human being has, accordingly, become a foundational question in this field. The human person may be examined through diverse epistemic lenses: At times subjected to the scrutiny of biological analysis; at other times approached through psychological or sociological frameworks; and at still other times considered through philosophical and mystical discourse. This plurality of perspectives on human identity has underscored the significance of anthropological studies and drawn the attention of the majority of intellectuals.

Among the truths intimately bound to the human being is the discussion of true life; alongside discussions concerning the soul, its happiness, and its various existential modalities, the notion of true life has garnered particular intellectual attention. Every human being, within the orbit of worldly existence, directs his or her daily efforts toward a focal point or ultimate aspiration, and the hope of attaining this telos animates and energizes the dynamism of daily life. Yet it remains necessary to inquire: according to what criterion or standard may such a life be designated as true life? This question becomes all the more challenging in contexts where individuals actively seek pathways and modalities through which they may acquire, embody, and connect with true and pure life.

Thus, true life may be understood as a particular orientation and vision concerning the proper mode of human existence a conception whose reverberations necessitate the emergence of diverse intellectual schools and theoretical systems. The study of human reality plays a decisive role in delineating and conceptualizing the contours of true life, and one’s anthropological perspective serves as the primary determinant in defining the essence of such life. Life manifests in various modes - among them diabolic life, material life, rational life, horizontal life, and vertical life - each of which will be briefly examined in this study. We shall argue that true life stands in direct contrast to animalistic life, and that a substantial distinction must be drawn between the nature of life and true life, a distinction profound enough to be described as spanning from earth to heaven. Although considerable research has been devoted to human realities and to various internal and external dimensions of human specifications, the specific question of true life within the thought of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has remained insufficiently explored.

Addressing this lacuna constitutes one of the principal aims and scholarly contributions of the present work. This study seeks to elucidate and examine the notion of true human life from the perspective of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, addressing such questions as: What is meant by true life in his thought? Is true life identical with the pure life? to which existential dimensions of the human being does true life pertain? The present research approaches these questions through a descriptive-analytical methodology grounded in the philosophical and exegetical teachings of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī.

2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND

The present author has, as far as possible, conducted a search of the relevant literature. Although this search yielded no prior background literature directly addressing this specific topic, it did identify several closely related studies that are helpful to the present research:

“The role of Self-knowledge and the Hayāt Ṭayyibah in the Meaningfulness of Life from the perspective of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, with Emphasis on al-Mizān”(Qanawāṭi et al, p.1). This study examines self-knowledge and its implications such as awareness of one’s deficiencies, purification of the soul, liberation from passive modes of existence, perceiving oneself in the presence of God, attaining nearness to Him, and ultimately self-annihilation as factors that enable the individual to attain the pure life. The authors conclude that the outcomes of such self-knowledge are primarily grounded in faith and righteous action.

“True Human Life and the Religious Strategy for Its Realization”(Ḥājī Šādiqī & Jalālwand, p. 1). This work defines true life as a mode of existence that unfolds across intellectual, ethical, political, social, and other dimensions, ultimately culminating in the domain of Divine attraction within the path of perfection. The authors outline religion’s strategic role in five areas: determining the trajectory of human movement, appointing a guide, providing the means and instruments for existential progress, identifying obstacles and their remedies, and explicating the ultimate telos. The study foregrounds the operational and behavioral roles of human action under divine guidance, considering religion a central component in the realization of true life.

Although the article is comprehensive and coherent, it lacks a substantive philosophical foundation. In contrast, the present research, while employing revelatory sources, accords a significant role to reason and philosophy in establishing the ontology of true life.

“The Theoretical Foundations and Indicators of the *Hayāt Ṭayyibah* from the Perspective of the Qur’an and Ḥadīth” (Nabavī, p. 1&2).

This thesis addresses the nature and qualities of the pure life, then examines its underlying foundations. It equates the pure life with true and ideal human life, viewing worldly existence as its preparatory stage and the Hereafter as its full manifestation. It contends that the realization of this life occurs in this world, though with differing degrees among individuals.

Based on the research background section, three works closely related to the topic have been introduced: Qanawātī et al. have addressed the role of self-knowledge and the pure life in the meaningfulness of life, but their analysis focuses more on ethical and faith-related outcomes and lacks a philosophical and ontological foundation. Ḥājī Šādiqī and Jalālband have examined true life in intellectual, ethical, political, and social dimensions and have demonstrated the strategic role of religion in its realization; however, as the article itself states, their work does not possess a firm philosophical character and analysis and places greater emphasis on the function of religion. Nabavī, in his thesis, has explored the theoretical foundations and indicators of the pure life from the perspective of the Qur’an and Ḥadīth, but first, he has not addressed the obstacles to attaining the pure life, and second, he has confined himself to foundational research.

The neglected gap is that none of these works has provided a comprehensive ontological analysis of “true life” in the thought of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, nor have they systematically explained its relationship with “pure life.” The present article, drawing on exegesis and philosophy, regards the nature of true life as being of the category of existence and perfection, demonstrates its distinction from the pure life in terms of scope and locus of realization, and examines its enabling conditions and impediments. This is precisely the gap that the present research fills.

3. SEMANTICS

3.1 Life (Ḥayāt)

ayāt is the antonym of death (Ibn Manzūr, 1992: vol. 14, p. 221); it is also employed in the meaning of benefit (Zubaidī, 1992: vol. 19, p. 366). Rāghib enumerates several meanings of life:

The nutritive faculty found in vegetative and animals;

The sensor faculty, because of this power, animals are called animals;

The rational agent faculty;

The eternal life of the Hereafter, the purpose of this life is the intellect;

Life in the meaning of the removal of sorrow;

The life attributed to God, meaning a mode of being to which death is impossible (Rāghib, 1990: pp. 368–369).

Life in the meaning of infinitive are “being alive”; and as a Gerund it denotes life or living in opposite to death (Mu‘eīn, 2007: vol. 1, p. 605).

3.2 Reality (Ḥaqīqat)

Ḥaqīqat is infinitive of ḥaqq (truth) and origin of truth signifies conformity and correspondence (Rāghib, 1990: p. 246). It carries meanings such as the essence of a thing, its quiddity, the opposite of concept, the unveiling of the Divine Essence beyond determinations, and the actual state of affairs. In theological and mystical discourse, reality of human denotes the “comprehensive man” (Mu‘īn, 2007: vol. 1, pp. 597–598).

Despite the lexical clarity of ḥayāt, its technical definition has given rise to divergent perspectives, for understandings of life vary according to differing conceptions of the human being. In biology, life is considered merely a property of organisms, not their full reality. In theology and philosophy, however, life embodies an altogether distinct meaning; and within sociological and psychological discourse, the term acquires yet another range of connotations. The significance of this inquiry becomes manifest when one observes that human beings have not pursued a unified vision of life. These divergent perspectives have produced a variety of intellectual schools and ideological movements, particularly in the age of science, modernity, and renaissance, from humanism, feminism, and nihilism to theistic, philosophical, and mystical traditions.

The interpretive outcomes of these differing anthropologies necessitate a profound reconsideration of true life. Thus, seeking out the truth of the human being apart from true life yields nothing, for the truth of life is contingent upon the identity and essence of the human being. In the interest of brevity, a selection of anthropological and life-oriented views is presented here, followed by an exposition of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s perspectives on life and true life.

According to Jawādī Āmolī, some thinkers exalt the human being excessively: Protagoras claims, “Man is the measure of all things”; Max Stirner asserts, “I rely on nothing but myself”; and Spinoza declares, “Man is a god to man.” Conversely, others diminish the status of the human being: Hobbes describes humanity as possessing a “wolf-like nature”; Nietzsche calls the human “an unfinished animal.” In Christian anthropology, the human being is inherently sinful and can never attain purification except through the sacrificial death of the Son of God (Jesus), whereby he reaches celestial truth (Jawādī, 2005a, p. 280).

In Marxist thought, the human being and life are interpreted through the framework of labor and material production. Marx argues that human self-realization is intelligible only through labor, which he calls “the act of human self-creation.” Human life is to live an active life and appropriate the external world; an inactive human is essentially dead. The active man can make the world comfortable for himself by using his powers. Marx describes human active life “the productive life”. He believes that life nurtures life and that free and conscious activity is man’s existential nature. He views human essence as one that actualizes human powers by labor. In Marx’s view, the alienated human being is he who views himself and the world as passive and accepts a split between subject and object (Fromm, 1994, pp. 33–39).

Some anthropological perspectives see in humanity nothing but the residue of a cosmic accident, the Big Bang, an ineffable event that triggers the spontaneous emergence of time, space, light, and matter, somewhere in whose midst the human origin is traced and defined as its product. This is in spite of the fact that the origin of the cosmic event is ineffable and its future ambiguous and its meaning unknown. On this account, life is reduced to matter and objects of sense perception, and human nature is not physical only in its atomic and molecular constitution but its self-organization has also originated from a physical-chemical organization. This organization has created observable qualities that constitute life. Thus, man becomes a temperate being that operates at 37° Celsius. (Morin, 2005, pp. 30–32).

From this perspective, a number of specifications are attributed to the human being, including:

The human being is a mortal creature and, like other living organisms, bears biochemical unity and genetic uniformity.

The human being is a living super-organism who, in an astonishing and wondrous manner, has brought the capacities of life to full efflorescence and, in moments of ecstasy and intoxication, loses all sense of measure.

The human being is a meta-being who, on the basis of the qualitative nature of his knowledge, creates a novel form of spiritual, psychological, and social life.

The human being is a creature that has emerged from the vertebrate lineage and the mammalian class of the primate order (apes, monkeys, and humans).

The human being is an intensely sexual animal; like the chimpanzee, human sexual pleasure is not seasonal and is not confined solely to reproduction, but permeates all behaviors, ideas, and dreams.

The human being is a super-organism among the primates who has transformed the scattered and unstable traits of advanced apes into stable qualitative specifications.

From this standpoint, the human being is very close to the chimpanzee and the gorilla, sharing approximately 98% of genes with them, and possessing only 2% novel and unprecedented genes, which have given rise to remarkable phenomena (Morin, 2005: 35–38).

The intelligent human being becomes fully human only within culture and alongside culture. Without the capacities of the human brain, culture

would not exist; yet without culture, there is neither speech nor thought. The emergence of culture brings about a transformation in the trajectory of evolution. By culture is meant customs and traditions, behaviors, bodies of knowledge, beliefs, ideas, prohibitions, values, and myths (Morin, 2005: 44).

Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, in defining life, maintains that any being endowed with perception and capable of acting on the basis of that perception is, in fact, alive possesses the attributes of life. This perception, in its general sense, refers to sensory awareness that is extrinsic to the essence; accordingly, the acts issuing from such a being are likewise limited and grounded in the specific mode of animal perception. He regards knowledge and power as necessary concomitants of life, not identical with it; therefore, knowledge and power may be conceptually distinguished from life itself. On this basis, any being that possesses knowledge and power may be considered a living being, and such life constitutes an existential perfection for an animal (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1994: p. 307). However, 'Allāmah does not suffice this. He further asserts that the intended meaning of life is the scientific existence of beings, in such a way that beings understand their own essence (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2005: vol. 2, p. 105).

Allāmah says:

"Beyond the senses there exists another principle which is the source of sensations, cognitive perceptions, and actions grounded in knowledge and will; and this is what is called life; Thus, life is a mode of existence from which knowledge and power emanate." (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 2, pp. 328–329).

With the 'Allāmah's eloquent view and eloquent statement on the subject of life, which she considered to be an existential category and a type of existence, it can be said that the Allamah has referred life to existence and organized this topic under the originality of existence, and she necessarily considers it to be a question of doubt and hierarchy. It is deduced from this that he has interrogated and encapsulated life in the system of transcendental wisdom; therefore, Allameh's view on life is a reproduction of Sadra's view.

4. THE TRUE LIFE OF HUMAN IN THE THOUGHT OF 'ALLĀMAH ṬABĀṬABĀ'Ī

Having outlined Ṭabāṭabā'ī's general conception of life, it is now necessary to examine more closely the relationship he establishes between true life and life in its primary ontological sense, and to consider within which stratum of the classical tripartite typology of life vegetative, animal, and human he situates the truth of human life. A further question arises concerning whether these three grades of life share a stable, unifying principle, or whether they remain fundamentally disparate. Most importantly, we must determine under which of these existential modalities 'Allāmah locates the category of true life.

4.1 The Reality of Life

In seeking to recover the reality of life we must approach it through an ontological view, attempting by means of philosophical analysis to elucidate its nature. Yet life is one of those realities whose essence remains exceedingly difficult to grasp; it has often been described as a reality whose quiddity is inaccessible. Although its concept and instances, divine life and the life of possibility beings can be discussed with relative ease, but, its depth of essence and truth remains obscure; Both theologians and philosophers agree that the human intellect cannot reach the quiddity of life; we can know life only through its effects and concomitants, namely knowledge and power or causal efficacy (Ḥaydarī, 2008: vol. 2, p. 192).

Despite this difficulty, thinkers have analyzed life on several levels:

General Meaning: In the natural sciences, life is the principle responsible for growth, reproduction, and nutrition; it is therefore predicated of vegetative, animals, and human, while inanimate entities lack these qualities.

Specific Meaning: Life sense, refers to a being capable of perception and of performing actions by voluntarily. In this sense, life as the source of perception and volitional action pertains to the entire domain of animals (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, 1995: vol. 2, p. 525; Ḥaydarī, 2008: vol. 2,

p. 190). Of course, the meaning of perception in all animals does not include sensory perception, including touch, taste, sight, hearing, and smell, but rather such perception, which is the source of the issuance of that life, is only touch alone; because, among animals, some of them lack some of the five perceptions; therefore, a perceptive living being is a freedomed knowing; Any object that has such a characteristic is called an "animal" (Ḥaydarī, 2008: pp.190-192).

Most Specific Meaning: At this level, life have conformation to knowledge of God and of the Hereafter (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, 1995, vol. 2, p. 525).

It is essential to distinguish between the reality of life and true life. The truth of life is different from true life; however, in the case of true life, which is an additional, subsidiary, and subsequent category to the principle of life, it can be viewed more from a longitudinal perspective and examples can be sought within its circle. We have briefly reviewed what the truth of life is from the perspective of Allamah. We have already summarized 'Allāmah's view: life refers to a mode of existence in which a being perceives and acts in accordance with that perception. and knowledge (perception) and power (action) are its potential, not actual, requirements. That is, a "living" being has the dignity of perception and the origin of action, not being both perceiver and agent in actual form. Because, sometimes, a living being in sleep or unconsciousness is not the perceiver and the origin of action, while it is characterized by life. So it becomes clear that life is not the soul of perception and the principle of action, but rather the necessary life of these two. Therefore, any being that is endowed with the two attributes of "perception" and "principle of action" is called "alive," and life is the principle of perception and action (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1994: p. 307; Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1992: p. 169; Dehqāni, 2009: vol. 3, p. 436). 'Allāmah occasionally treats power as posterior to knowledge and life (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1991: p. 102). Of course, the meaning of the connection between life, perception, and the power of objectivity and correspondence is not because the best proof for this claim is their inseparability from each other (Ḥaydarī, 2008: vol. 2, p. 191).

Therefore, in the philosophical view of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the nature of life in this statement is of the category of existence and perfection, with knowledge and power being among its requisites, and it encompasses animal and human life, whereas plant life cannot be traced under this clarification and explanation. For sensory and particular perception along with will does not encompass plant life.

4.2 Types of Life

Life and its requirements, namely knowledge and power, are common attributes among all types of animals, including humans; in considering a human being as having a pure and developed life, the coexistence of these three elements is essential; because, in the encounter and intersection of explaining the supreme position of man, including the true life of having life, knowledge and power, they play a significant role. More importantly, the approach and view on life in the literature of the people of art and thought has not been the same and has undergone differences in opinion in the length of history and the passage of time; with regard to life, the philosopher looks at it from a perspective, and the pioneers of ethics and the standard-bearers of interpretation And the pioneers of mysticism look at life from a different angle and path and count its types; below we will look at some approaches and tendencies regarding life and its types:

A. The Ontological Perspective

the ontological view of life, some Islamic philosophers, including Mullā Ṣadrā, despite considering life to be existential and perfect thing, divide it into three categories: vegetative life, animal life, and human life (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, 1981, p. 184; Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, 1998, p. 310). Ṣadrā additionally posits a fourth mode, the intellectual life, attained through the perfection of the intellect. This is the life enjoyed by the martyrs who are "Nay, they live Finding their sustenance from their Lorrd" ('Al-imrān:169); such sustenance is intellectual and luminous, not sensory or imaginal (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, 1981: p. 146). Allāmah also, with an ontological view of life, believes in three lives for living beings, which are vegetative life, animal life(the origin of consciousness, material pleasures, and voluntary movement), and human life; it is possible for a human being to have these three lives simultaneously (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 7, p. 337). On the other hand, 'Allāmah

ontologically assigns three lives to man: life before the world, life in the world, and life after the world; he says: 'Man, in this world, stands between two lives: one preceding and one subsequent life' (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 1, p. 92).

Considering the 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī's words, it seems that when 'Allāmah considers life as vegetative, animal, and human, he refers to man "in the world," and when he seeks to explain the absolute nature of human life in the world of existence, he examines and examines man in a limited and specific manner in three aspects: "before the world," "in the world," and "after the world." Therefore, man "in the world" can be examined within the circle of three lives (vegetative, animal, and human).

There remains room for criticism and objection is life equal to the soul or not, given that philosophers, especially the Peripatetics also classify the soul into three kinds? But the Transcendent Philosophy upholds the unity of the soul, which unfolds different faculties through substantial motion; In response, in response to these objections, it can be said that there are distinctions between the soul and life, both conceptually and instance.

The soul ontologically precedes life; first the soul created, and then, as a result of its development and connection with the body, it reproduces life

the soul is generally the origin and principal of knowledge and power, including life. Not the effects of something else, while life itself is the effects and state that arises as a result of the relationship between knowledge and power.

According to Ṣadrā, the relation between soul and life is causal: the soul by divine permission is the efficient cause of life (Ṣadr al-Muta'alihīn, 1975: p. 231).

B. The Ethical Perspective

In the ethical view of life, there is no longer any talk of the ontology of life; rather, there is talk of functionalism and behaviorism. That is, the manner and quality of behavior and actions in human society are observed, and the reproduction of ugliness and goodness is targeted at this life. They are referred to as divine life, demonic life, and animal life; and are investigated and traced in moral and Quranic literature. This animal life is fundamentally different from the life that was discussed in the ontological perspective, including the animal life in the view that the purpose of human degradation from divine-human life to animal life, which is summarized in lust, anger, eating, and sleeping. That is, if a human being is characterized by animal life, it means that he contains the specifications of vice and ugliness, and has damaged his dignity and position as a human being. Another title that can be given to divine life is precisely vertical life, and animal life can be called horizontal life.

5. TRUE HUMAN LIFE

The discussion of true life, as approached through the exegetical and philosophical lens of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, is of considerable value. In this section, the essential features of true human life; its ontological locus, its imperishability or permanence, and the domain of its realization are examined. Addressing these elements reveals the distinctions between true life and pure life, and ultimately clarifies the difference between true life and happiness.

True life may be understood as a mode of existence encompassing the spiritual, ethical, intellectual, political, social, and individual dimensions of human life, such that in the course of existential perfection it culminates in the attractive sphere of the Divine. God, the Exalted, has endowed all human beings with the capacity and predisposition to attain this life; yet the actualization of these latent capacities requires a particular strategy and spiritual methodology (Ḥājī Ṣādiqī & Jalālvand, 2021: p. 87). Among these conditions, true life becomes attainable specifically through the theomorphic vocation of vicegerency (Jawādī, 2010: p. 151).

The fundamental criterion distinguishing death from true life in the human being is thought, perception, and consciousness. These either lead to pure faith, through which the human being attains vitality, or they deviate toward polytheism, unbelief, and hypocrisy, which drag the

human person into existential and spiritual ruin (Jawādī, 2005a: p. 128). Put differently, true life lies beyond the plane of outward and animal life, which only some persons possess. One who enjoys true life partakes of a reality inaccessible to others a reality whose effects surpass those of merely animal existence. True human life is not confined to this worldly, material existence; its domain extends to the eschatological life, while in this world it activates the various dimensions of the human being, thereby manifesting the true ontological identity of the person (Jawādī, 2009: vol. 11, p. 165; Ḥājī Ṣādiqī & Jalālvand, 2021: p. 88), inside of exterior and corporeal life, the human being possesses another form of "spiritual life" which arises from one's deeds and conduct. One's ultimate happiness or misery in the Hereafter depends upon this inner life; and within each community, the Divine Proof occupies the highest degree of spiritual mundane (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1999: pp. 194–196).

From Ṭabāṭabā'ī's perspective, spiritual life enjoys greater ontological primacy than material and formal life. The genuine identity of the human being rests upon his moral and spiritual telos, whereas the animalistic and appetitive dimensions are merely subsidiary to this real identity (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1985: vol. 3, p. 178). Elsewhere he refers to this spiritual life as the "higher human life" (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2009a: vol. 2, p. 287). 'Allāmah Ja'farī designates true and pure life as "rational life" a life in which the essential dimensions of the human being are actualized along the path of perfection and rendered fruitful (Ja'farī, 1997: vol. 4, p. 63). Thus, rational life is identical with true life, which the Qur'ān refers to as pure life (Ḥājī Ṣādiqī & Jalālvand, 2021: p. 90).

The ultimate purpose of human creation is the journey toward the Source of Being and nearness to Him; for the human being is His dependent, His possession, and His servant (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 20, p. 242). God has implanted within every person the capacity to undertake this journey. Whoever actualizes this innate potential attains the encounter with God (Jawādī, 2009: vol. 1, p. 457). Conversely, deviation from this path yields eternal misery, and the worth of every human being corresponds to the degree of his presence and movement upon this path. True human life is necessarily connected to the trans-material dimensions of existence; material life is subject to alteration and annihilation. True life, in Ṭabāṭabā'ī's thought, is grounded in the human soul, not in the material aspect of the human being. Human identity, likewise, depends upon the spiritual, immaterial dimension whose ultimate end is nearness to God; a goal attained by traversing the Straight Path (Ḥājī Ṣādiqī & Jalālvand, 2021: p. 89).

According to 'Allāmah, the ultimate end of human creation with respect to spiritual life is the perception of Truth through intellection one of the innate faculties of the human, while the final end of worldly, material, and formal life is the arrival at one's appointed term (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1995: vol. 17, p. 526). Hence, one may establish a harmony between worldly life and spiritual life: the two are not mutually exclusive; rather, worldly life provides the substrate for the emergence of spiritual true life. Their integration yields what may be called authentic spiritual life.

Ṭabāṭabā'ī maintains that Islam never separates material life from spiritual life; any blueprint it presents for spiritual life is designed likewise to structure worldly life (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2008: p.100). Drawing upon the Qur'ān and the teachings of Islam, he argues that neither purely material life constitutes true life, nor does the enjoyment of material advantages equate to real felicity. True human life is that which integrates matter and meaning, and genuine happiness lies in whatever conduces to well-being in both this world and the next. The implication of this vision is that the laws governing life must be grounded in primordial nature and creation, rather than in human conjecture about self-interest. Its further implication is that spiritual guidance must be based on adherence to Truth, not on the passions of the soul or the fluctuating sentiments of the majority (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2009a: vol. 2, p. 229).

Ṭabāṭabā'ī says:

"As for the life of the Hereafter, in which the human being lives by his true perfection acquired through faith and righteous action this is the life whose occupation entails no diversion a permanence without annihilation, a happiness without misery; this is life in the truest sense of the word" (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 16, p. 149).

Here, the distinction between the wretched and the blissful becomes manifest: only through perfected faith and righteous deeds does the

human being attain true life. In Ṭabāṭabā'ī's view, the wretched and the people of Hell remain deprived of the fruition of true eschatological life, despite being encompassed by God's all-embracing mercy. They are deprived because Divine mercy is veiled from them by a barrier and this veil is heedlessness the root of all sin and punishment (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2009b: pp. 203–204).

5.1 Specifications of True Life

In view of the foregoing discussions, several key specifications of true life may now be identified:

a) Perfection and Gradational Nature: The first point that emerges to mind is that true life is a perfection and an existential reality, not a merely conceptual one. Just as its concomitants perception and power are gradational and possess multiple degrees, life itself is no exception. Life is a gradational phenomenon; whose highest degree culminates in true life. In clearer terms, true life encompasses within itself the totality of lower forms of life. Since for 'Allāmah, life is a mode of perfection, he considers the perfection attainable in this world negligible, and even frivolous when compared with the perfection of the Hereafter. He thus regards eschatological life as the genuine life of the human being. The human being who attains true perfection does so only in the context of otherworldly life, a life immune to death and dissolution (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 2, p. 329). True life unfolds in varying degrees, and its realization depends on the measure of one's adherence to divine teachings. Higher degrees of true life require not only inner conviction but also comprehensive commitment to all divine commands individual, social, political, and ethical. In this framework, both the goodness of the efficient and the goodness of the act constitute the prerequisites for true and pure life (Ḥājī Ṣādiqī & Jalālvand, 2021: p. 92).

Therefore, the true life of the human being is in reality the immortality and everlastingness of the soul and spiritual life in the other abode, where the soul attains the perfection worthy of it and delights in that perfection. For the vessel of the world, due to its existential limitation and its obstacles and distractions, is never capable of attaining the true perfections of the soul. 'Allāmah's statement about true life can be interpreted as life in the light of felicity and connection to the most abundant and excellent of existential perfections for the soul in the hereafter.

b) Essential and inherent: 'Allāmah holds that the most complete and perfect instance of true life belongs exclusively to God. This primordial life is essential, original, eternal, and everlasting, admitting no possibility of destruction. It is, by essence, possessed only by the Necessary Being. All other forms of life, whether angelic, human, animal, or vegetative are derivative, contingent, and dependent upon Him. The human being can partake of this perfection only through bestowal and endowment, or in philosophical terms, through another (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 2, p. 330; Jawādī, 2009: vol. 12, p. 99).

c) Imperishability: Permanence and immunity from decline constitute central attributes of true life. In the domain of true and eschatological life, death and annihilation have no place, and it is metaphysically impossible for such life to be subject to cessation. In contrast, worldly life, rooted in sensory, vegetative, and animal dimensions is inherently marked by death, decay, and deficiency (Jawādī, 2009: vol. 12, p. 99).

d) Universal Accessibility: True life, as a value of existential perfection, is universally attainable and characterized by comprehensiveness and enduring validity. Through the cultivation of certain conditions, such as purification of the soul, the advancement of theoretical understanding, and the preservation of sound innate disposition and reason any human being can reach the sanctified realm of true life. However, individuals do not share equally in this spiritual harvest. Their share of true life corresponds to the extent of their attainment of these conditions (Ḥājī Ṣādiqī & Jalālvand, 2021: p. 90).

e) Non-Conventional Nature: This characteristic indicates that true human life is realized only through distinguishing genuine realities from mere social or mental conventions. Should true life be expended or sacrificed for the sake of conventional affairs, this constitutes one of the gravest losses of human existence (Jawādī, 2005a: pp. 109 & 114).

5.2 The Distinction Between True Life and Pure Life

In Allamah Tabatabai's view, life is an existential, perfective, and gradational matter belonging to the category of existence, and knowledge

and power are among its concomitants, not its essence; therefore, life has levels, and in man it can be examined as vegetative, animal, and human life, and in his entire existence in three stages: before this world, in this world, and after this world (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 2, pp. 328–329; vol. 7, p. 337; vol. 1, p. 92; Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 19694: p. 307). True life in this system is man's spiritual and higher life, grounded in his soul and immaterial dimension; its end is nearness to God and the actualization of the soul's perfections in the Hereafter, and since it belongs to existential perfection, death and decay have no way into it; Allama considers it the union of matter and meaning, and regards its final instance as in the vicinity of divine mercy in the Hereafter (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 16, p. 149; vol. 20, p. 242; vol. 17, p. 526). The good/pure life (*ḥayāt ṭayyibah*) is also the Qur'anic expression of this same perfection in the verse "fa-la-nuḥyiyannahu ḥayātan ṭayyibah"; Allama takes "revivification" to mean the effusion of life and its bestowal upon man, not a change in the quality of life, because if the intention were only to purify the quality, He would have said "fa-la-nuṭayyibanna ḥayātahu"; thus the verse speaks of creating a new life other than the common life of people (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 12, pp. 341–342). In this life, faith is its spirit, and its continuance depends on righteous action (Tabatabai, 1390 AH, vol. 4, p. 80). *Ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is a life in which misery, darkness, grief, and poverty have no way, and which is full of joy, delight, light, and conscience; opposite to it stand the life of ignorance of God's station and the malignant life mixed with disbelief (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 1, p. 129; vol. 2, p. 168; vol. 15, p. 96). Their commonality is that both belong to existential perfection, transcend material and animal life, are rooted in faith and righteous action, are grounded in the soul, are imperishable in their final end, and have nearness to God as their goal; the means of attainment are also shared: intellect, faith, theoretical knowledge, free will, and righteous action, and the obstacles are also sin, following caprice, disbelief, polytheism, and ignorance. Therefore, their difference is not essential; rather, the difference is in level, instance, inclusiveness, and expansion.

The main difference lies in the locus of realization and the direction of inclusiveness. *Ḥayāt ṭayyibah* has a broad locus and includes this world and the Hereafter; the believer attains a degree of the new and pure life even in this world, although its perfection is in the Hereafter (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 10, p. 80). By contrast, true life, as the final goal and true felicity, has its full locus of realization in the Hereafter, and in this world is present only as potentiality, preamble, or lower levels (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 16, p. 149; vol. 6, p. 186). Hence their relation differs from two directions: if we consider true life as final perfection and the otherworldly goal, it is general, and *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is one of its fruits, levels, or manifestations; as in some expressions, true felicity is itself the otherworldly *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 6, p. 186), and in other expressions, true life is identical with felicity or transcends it, and *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is the fruit of felicity. But if we consider *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* as the Qur'anic title including this world and the Hereafter, then with respect to locus it is broader than the otherworldly true life. Thus their logical relation is absolute particular and general from two directions: with respect to final end and perfection, true life is more general; with respect to worldly-otherworldly scope, *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is more general. The argument is: first, life is gradational and has levels; second, true life is the otherworldly goal and is identical with felicity or transcends it; third, *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is a fruit and level of felicity that appears through faith and righteous action in this world and the Hereafter; the conclusion is that *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is the bridge and faithful manifestation of true life, not something alien to it. Therefore, they do not differ essentially, and differ only in consideration, inclusiveness, expansion, and level; *ḥayāt ṭayyibah* is the worldly-otherworldly manifestation of true life, and true life is its final horizon and complete actualization in the vicinity of divine mercy. These two are attainable by all human beings with the required measure of faith and righteous action, but the degrees of attainment are not equal and vary according to self-purification, theoretical knowledge, sound intellect, and practical commitment (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1968: vol. 8, p. 273; vol. 6, p. 188).

5.3 The Factors and Impediments of True Life

5.3.1 The Factors of Attainment

The aspiration to attain true life a life that is authentic, beatific, eternal, and imperishable is nurtured within every human being. The necessary preconditions for realizing this mode of existence are indebted to

specific existential and spiritual qualities; only upon achieving the requisite measure of these qualities does one enter the rank of those possessing true life. The principal factors may be outlined as follows:

a) Reason: By reason is meant the cognitive faculty operative in both the theoretical and practical domains. Philosophically, reason is the faculty of intellection through which the human soul apprehends theoretical and practical cognitions. Theoretical knowledge pertains to the apprehension of “is” and “is not,” which includes physics, mathematics, and theology, and is also referred to as *weltanschauung*, and practical knowledge is of the type of action and effort, not science and thought; and it includes the realm of “oughts” and “oughtn’ts”, which is called ideology; and in religious texts, reason not only has a perceptual application, but is also a tool for leading to servitude (Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, 1987: vol. 1, pp. 30, 34; Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 1, p. 48; Jawādī Āmolī: 2005b, p. 29).

b) Faith: faith is the assent and inner certitude toward a truth, accompanied by existential commitment to its implications (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 15, p. 6). In ‘Allāmah’s thought, it is among the most foundational elements in the constitution of both the pure life and the true life. Faith, in its purest form, is the animating spirit of these two modes of life and requires righteous action for its continued subsistence (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 4, p. 80). Faith draws the human being toward the Truth, introducing God as the ultimate destination and final telos of human existence (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 10, p. 16). Thus, proximity to God is precisely the realization of the human being’s true life.

c) Theoretical Knowledge: In ‘Allāmah’s perspective, the essence of knowledge is disclosure and ontological unveiling (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 1, p. 50); the type of knowledge intended in this context is empirical knowledge. Knowledge and belief, both belonging to this class, play a decisive role in the elevation of human spiritual life, enabling ascent toward spiritual and true existence. Knowledge and conviction elevate the human station; and the word “word purity” purpose in the verse “To Him mount up all words of purity. It is he who exalts Each Deed of Righteousness” (Qur’ān, Fatir:10), refers to knowledge and belief in God (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 1, p. 37). Human beings are afforded an eternal and unbounded life after this worldly existence one that depends directly on their spiritual conduct, acquisition of dispositions befitting divine unity, and realization of servanthood. Should one establish the foundation of his earthly life upon neglecting unity and concealing Divine truths, he thereby destroys his very soul and true humanity (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 2, p. 119).

d) Freedom and Will: freedom and free will constitute essential ontological degrees of the human soul and belong to its vital perfections. According to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, the human by virtue of his creation and existential structure is a conscious and will entity; that is, he is an agent endowed with the capacity for choice and able to select among various courses of action, even though the very principle of freedom is inseparably rooted in his existential poverty toward the Necessary Being and is therefore neither conventionally optional nor a form of metaphysical determinism (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2005: vol. 1, p. 553). Moreover, there exists an intrinsic correspondence between the cognitive dimension and the will dimension of the human being: will cannot be conceived without cognition, and cognition does not attain its full actuality without the possibility of preference and selection (Mousāvi, -Moqāddām, 2011: p. 67). What is meant by will is the same power of human choice between the preferred and the preferred or the equal of the two, not the discussion of philosophical and theological predestination and will, as angels do not benefit from such a divine gift; This freedom and will provide the basis for legislative law and are subject to the musts and must-nots of obligatory rulings. Therefore, freedom and will play an important role in the formation and mechanism of true and spiritual life.

e) Righteous deeds: Righteous deeds occupies a central and determinative position in attaining true life, for true life as a mode of transcendent and spiritual existence becomes actual only through deeds that embody self-purification, truthfulness, interior sincerity, and most importantly, piety, avoiding sins, and fulfilling divine obligations are important in the exaltation of a person’s spiritual and divine life. In ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view, piety is not merely an ethical virtue but a principle of epistemic disclosure and access to truth; it expands the inner capacity of the soul to receive divine realities and spiritual

illuminations. ‘Allāmah asserts that piety guarantees the soul’s ability to discern truth from falsehood, for through piety the human being attains both epistemic clarity and spiritual expansiveness that enable the unveiling of metaphysical truths and the flourishing of elevated spiritual life (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, n.d., pp. 314–315). Thus, righteous action deed is not merely a set of ethical practices but constitutes a mode of existential ascension, facilitating the elevation of the soul and opening the horizons of supra-natural and authentic life.

5.3.2 Obstacles to Attaining True Life

The factors that precipitate the fall and descent of the human being from his exalted existential station consist of various vicious and reprehensible dispositions. Among the most significant of these are the following:

a) Sin and Submission to Carnal Desire: Submission to carnal desire constitutes one of the principal impediments that prevent the human being from attaining true life and authentic happiness. In Qur’anic discourse, one who follows the impulses of the lower self is no longer regarded as a true monotheist; rather, his desire becomes his object of worship. Such a person, by yielding to unrestrained appetite, engaging in rumor-spreading without knowledge, and sowing discord among people, inevitably brings about his own ruin (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 2, p. 101). Moreover, the unbridled desires of the soul stand in total enmity against the intellect and undermine its governance (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1985: vol. 2, p. 290).

Thus, an individual polluted by sin and moral transgression whose pure inner disposition has been obscured by the shadows of egocentric passions cannot realistically aspire to the attainment of spiritual and true life.

b) Disbelief and Polytheism: Polytheism, regarded as the gravest form of injustice, leads the human being into the deepest degrees of spiritual darkness, misfortune, and wretchedness. Disbelief and polytheism are two major vices: the former arises from a deficiency in the theoretical faculty, while the latter emerges from rebellion and tyranny in the practical faculty, manifesting as dual devotion and divided obedience. Both of these function as barriers obstructing the human being from access to the domain of true and pure life.

Polytheism represents the most pernicious form of deviation, and concepts such as polytheism, misguidance, and injustice are, in their concrete realization, inseparably intertwined. On the straight path, neither polytheism nor misguidance can ever occur. In such a station, disbelief cannot penetrate the heart, nor can the limbs commit sin due to negligence in obedience. This is the rank of the companions of the straight path; the true believers whose hearts and actions remain purified from polytheism, injustice, and misguidance, and who thereby attain the loftiest degrees of spiritual perfection (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 1, pp. 29–30).

Accordingly, this rank is itself a manifestation of true life, intrinsically woven with purity, stability, and existential firmness. piety, which encompasses all degrees of faith and perfection, plays a decisive role in achieving felicity, whereas polytheism and misguidance, standing in contrast to faith divert the human being from the path of salvation and authentic life (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1968: vol. 2, p. 57).

c) Ignorance: Ignorance, the antithesis of knowledge, represents one of the profound inner veils that obstruct the soul from self-knowledge and from knowledge of God. According to ‘Allāmah, those who attain divine proximity possess no inner veil, such as ignorance between themselves and their Lord; rather, they believe in God with certainty and clarity. Ignorance destroys the essence and reality of the human being, which is why, in scriptural and philosophical discourse, ignorance is associated with death, whereas knowledge is associated with life (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2011: vol. 1, p. 273; vol. 2, pp. 119 & 180).

6. CONCLUSION

The principal findings of the present study may be summarized as follows:

1. Life as an Existential Perfection: Life, as a perfection and a mode of existence, is intelligible only within the doctrine of the primacy of existence, ‘Allāmah regards life as a fundamentally existential reality,

while knowledge and power constitute its necessary concomitants. Although the nature of life remains inaccessible to human cognition, its effects and concomitant features render it partially intelligible.

2. Three Ontological Grades of Life in the Human: From an ontological viewpoint, assigns three lives to man: vegetative, animal, and human; vegetative life is summarized in nutrition, growth, and reproduction; In addition to the three aforementioned attributes, animal life is endowed with two powers of anger and lust, and it performs its actions with will, and it has partial and sensory perception, and in human life, the perceiver, in addition to the above attributes, also has the perception of universal.

3. Moral–Qur’anic Typology of Life: In his ethical and Qur’anic analysis, ‘Allāmeḥ classifies life into satanic life, animalistic life, and divine–human life which this life is the ultimate type and highest form of life, which attainable through knowledge and righteous deeds, and constitutes the ultimate aspiration of the human being.

4. True Life as the Composed of Matter and Meaning: From ‘Allāmeḥ’s standpoint, true life is comprehensive between matter and meaning, and is something beyond material and animal life. Its complete realization is reserved for the Hereafter, where it is characterized by eternality and immunity from corruption. All human beings possess the potential to attain this mode of life, though its actualization depends on fulfilling certain essential conditions.

5. True Life as the Teleological Fulfillment of Human Existence: According to ‘Allāmeḥ, life is contingent upon the soul and the human identity. The ultimate trajectory and teleology of human existence consists in journeying toward the Divine Essence and finding repose in the realm of Lordship. The culmination of this journey is the attainment of true life. The principal conditions for achieving this state are reason, knowledge, faith, righteous action, and free choice; whereas the principal impediments include polytheism, ignorance, sin, and submission to carnal desires.

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